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ANDREW J. MCKENNA(Loyola University Chicago)
THE ENDSOF VIOLENCE.
GIRARDANDDERRIDA
Philosophers and literary critics alike have grown accustomed toconsider meaning as something that circulates between and amongsigns, verbal or written, rather than as a property of any one ofthem. This is elementary linguistics as advanced by Ferdinand deSaussure, who explains meaning as oppositive, negative, and rela-tive with respect to other meanings rather than a distinctive featurewe can isolate from the language as a whole. Jacques Derrida hascoined the word «différance», defined minimally as deferral in spa-ce and time, to name this rootless, nomadic flow, the «a» in theword suggesting an active participle which connotes movement, in-terplay, relation, rather than a stable entity1. Meaning is an effect ofdifférance, every sign being only the trace of others signs in endless,pointless relays.As I have argued elsewhere2, différance as active and passiveinterplay is a good account of mimetic desire among humans, whichis the founding insight upon which René Girard has developed hisanthropology. As first revealed in literary works, desire is shown tooriginate in others’ desires rather than in its putative objects or in aselfsame, autonomous, individual subject, who desires and acts in-dependently of other subjects. Violence erupts when these desiresconverge on an object which is indivisible, unsharable. Instead ofbeing individuals, humans are immersed in a myriad of relationsand conflicts of desire, for which Girard has coined the term «inter-dividuality», his only neologism for the way our desires imitate, re-plicate, and often oppose one another. For Girard every desire is thetrace of another desire, which a subject copies, most often unwit-tingly, from another subject, who in turn may imitate his imitator,
1 J. Derrida, La Différance, in Id.,Marges – de la philosophie, Paris, Ed. de Minuit, 1972, pp. 1-30.2 See A.J. McKenna, Violence and difference: Girard, Derrida, and Deconstruction, Urbana,IL, University of Illinois Press, 1992, and Id., Philanthropologie: la raison du plus faible, inM.R. Anspach (ed.), René Girard, Paris, Éditions de L’Herne, 2008, pp. 223-228.
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whereupon desire circulates through cycles of reciprocity whoseorigin is virtually irretrievable.We need to pursue these similarities further in order to moresharply determine their differences – not for their own sake but toappreciate how, amidst current threats of violence, their analysescontinue to corroborate and confirm each other.The universe of meaning for Derrida is Pascalian in its stru-cture, a circle whose circumference is nowhere, whose center is e-verywhere. There is no uniquely first word on which we could builda rational foundation for our meaning systems, nor any last wordtowards or from which we could orient our understanding of them;there is no privileged entry or exit from the free play of signs, no o-rigin which is not a repetition, which is not positioned by some re-lative, negative opposition; no last judgment, in a word.This is where Girard’s mimetic theory parts company withDerrida and it does so radically, since the roots (radix) of mimetictheory eventually reach down to a hypothesis of human and cul-tural origins that deconstruction disqualifies as a metaphysicalquest. Derridean différance (or dissemination) is self-perpetuating,suggesting upwardly, outwardly, endless spirals of meanings andrelations of meanings; mimetic theory is entropic, describing adownward, devastating spiral to the violent path of desire. Thisnarrative dimension would explain what propels Girard’s originaryhypothesis, which Derridean deconstruction rejects in principle, asa hieratic or theological «coup d’état» for a state of affairs withoutrational foundation.But that is just the point, a point of intersection between theirtwo lines of argument. Girard hypothesizes human origins as a pro-to-sacrificial scenario in which mimetic violence results in the warof all against all, that shatters and disperses the proto-human or ho-minid groups. The remedy to such a disorder is built into theviolence that produced it: the very same dynamic of mimetic vio-lence eventually streamlines and narrows down to focus on a singlemember of the group, with whose destruction the violence ends.Here is the point of human origin: a sudden calm results in a non-instinctual attention to the victim, which is mistaken as the sacredorigin of the new found unanimity and harmony for being the uni-que receptacle of the violence which, up to this point, prevented itscoming into existence. The scapegoat victim is the transcendentalsignifier of all the signifieds, all the basic conceptual differencesthat accumulate in its wake: before/after violence, inside/outside
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the group, sacred center/profane periphery3. The point is that thefoundation of human culture is not rational but religious; it is notborn out of reason but rather out of the violent expulsion of an arbi-trary victim to whose polarizing attraction and unanimous de-struction it awards sacred, foundational power. Yet this divinity isonly the projection of the group’s own violence that is rejected up-on another. As Giuseppe Fornari notes, the scapegoat mechanism isa «meccanismo adattativo di origine e di evoluzione della cultura»4.Girard’s hypothesis argues that origin and violence, origin and mi-mesis, origin and repetition (which is how mimetic desire operates)are one with the origin of religion: «Senza religioni l’uomo non sa-rebbe sopravvissuto a se stesso, non sarebbe nemmeno nato, per-ché non sarebbe riuscito a fronteggiare i fattori competitivi e con-flittuali che derivano dai comportamenti imitativi, e che si formanoin qualunque comunità umana»5.There is another aspect of différance that leads to further cor-relations between Derrida and Girard. It consists in the mere factthat a word is pronounced the same with either letter «e» or «a».For Plato this is reason enough to denounce writing as a poison(pharmakon) to memory for whose failings it is offered as a remedy(pharmakon). As such it is held to be alien to the presence of mindwith which we associate living thought and the quest for truth. In
La Pharmacie de Platon6 Derrida analyzes the Phaedrus in order toinquire into the origin of philosophy, where he demonstrates thatwriting is expelled for its very resemblance to truth in its iterability,its availability to repetition by anyone anywhere if it is true at all.What writing represents in the mute, mindless opacity of its arbi-trary marks, is formal, artificial representation, which must beexpelled in order for the transparency of conceptual differences totake root in the mind. What is expelled, in sum, is mimesis: form wi-thout content, without any originating or originary substance,whence Plato’s equation of writing to the work of the Sophists.Turning to Girard we find that the fate of writing in Plato isthe same of twins in mythology and some ritual practices, wherethey come to symbolize the dissolution of family differences, whe-
3R. Girard, Des Choses cachées depuis la fondations du monde, Paris, Grasset, 1978, pp.108-113.4G. Fornari - M. Ceruti, Le due paci. Cristianesimo e morte di Dio nel mondo globalizzato,Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2005, p. 106.5 Ibid., pp. 107-108.6 J. Derrida, La Pharmacie de Platon, in Id., La Dissemination, Paris, Seuil, 1972.
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reby they desymbolize altogether7. This is, for Plato, as later forRousseau and Husserl, what writing represents in its indifferenceto the meaning it allegedly re-presents. Twins, like writing, ge-nerate a crisis of difference, and then of all meaning, order, and va-lue, which their expulsion is averred to resolve. Accordingly, Gi-rard’s interpretation of sacrifice finds apt re-formulation in Derri-da’s analysis of writing, whose exclusion underlies the economy ofdifferences. As the revelation of différance, of dissemination, decon-struction is a critique of difference and a critique of violence, andspecifically of sacrificial violence.In sum Derrida reads the history of philosophy in its Platonicorigins and in its subsequent efforts of self-renewal as a sacrificialscenario, where systems owe their conceptual constructions to theviolent expulsion of an arbitrary feature of representation that theyrefuse to acknowledge, and acknowledge as their own: not merelyby virtue of the performative contradiction whereby these critiquesof writing are written down to be disseminated and (re)read, but,more seminally, by virtue of the fact that the endlessly negative, re-lative, oppositive character of language must be arbitrarily denied,discredited, disavowed, or repressed for the system to be able toconfide in its conceptual constructs. This, at the very least, is whatde-construction means.What conjoins Girard and Derrida is their suspicion of We-stern rationality in its fundamental structure, philosophy owing itsorigins to the covert violence underlying conceptuality, and cultureto the overt violence of sacrificial expulsion, of scapegoating mur-der. When we examine their later writings, we find a comparablecritique of violence as it is writ large on the pages of history.With the appearance of Achever Clausewitz8, we find Girardexpanding the implications of mimetic theory through a closereading of the Prussian general’s unfinished treatise Vom Kriege9.Girard’s reasoning follows upon the argument deployed in Des Cho-
ses cachées and subsequent books that, as stated most recently, «laPassion a dévoilé une fois pour toutes l’origine sacrificielle de l’hu-manité. Elle a défait le sacré en révélant sa violence»10. By proclai-ming the innocence of the victim of mob violence, by thematizing
7R. Girard, La Violence et le sacré, Paris, Grasset, 1972, p. 95.8 Id., Achever Clausewitz. Entretiens avec Benoît Chantre, Paris, Carnets Nord, 2007.9 C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Bd. 1-3, hrsg. von M. von Clausewitz, Berlin, FerdinandDümmler, 1832-1834.10R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 12.
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the scapegoat as the unanimous target of ubiquitously mimetic vio-lence that is sacrificially discharged onto the victim, Biblical revela-tion deprives culture of a mechanism behind which it veiled itsown, all-too-human violence. Sacrifice realizes an economy of vio-lence as pronounced succinctly by Caïphas in arguing for the exe-cution of Jesus: «it is expedient for you that one man should die forthe people and that the whole nation should not perish» (Jn 11, 49-50). That is an economy which Western religious tradition, in its Ju-daic and Christian strains, has educated its culture – slowly andever so painfully – to reject, to denounce in its every instance. ForGirard, the Dreyfus affair is a cardinal occurrence of this moral im-pulse.Once broadcast, the sacred alibi for human violence is abroga-ted. The responsibility of humans to one another, as proclaimed inIsrael’s Mosaic and prophetic tradition and confirmed by the Gos-pels, trumps ritual obligations and hieratic prohibitions of all sorts,including and especially ethnic and racial exclusivities; in sum allforms of «appartenenze violente»11. A culture’s resistance to thisrevelation only brings out its truth more transparently in the vio-lence engaged to repress it. The demystifying propensities of Wes-tern culture, which is irresistibly becoming world culture, is thebearer of scientific discovery and economic expansion unfetteredby sacred prohibitions; but it is also the agent of unprecedented,potentially world-destroying, apocalyptic violence, since rituals in-vented to contain it have been discredited. This is what Jesus is tobe understood as revealing when he says «I bring not peace but asword» (Mt 10, 34). He is declaring the end of traditional relationsof belonging, of obligation. Set relations of whom to help and whomto hate are abrogated by those of charity and forgiveness12. Historyis witness to the gradual and relentless erosion of sacrificial practi-ces whose mystifying role was to immunize cultures against the mi-metically contagious effects of their own violence by discharging itupon an arbitrary victim; as a result, human violence knows no bo-unds. This is a fact that we can no longer ignore amidst the exi-stential threat of nuclear annihilation as presaged by the uncon-trolled proliferation of atomic weapons.Christianity in this sense has functioned like an auto-immune
11G. Fornari - M. Ceruti, op. cit., p. 204.12 P. Dumouchel, Le Sacrifice inutile. Essai sur la violence politique, Paris, Flammarion, 2011,pp. 31-35, 225-233.
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system, as described by Derrida in Voyous13, where he meditates atlength on a post-Cold War world whose political structures arethreatened by the emergence of rootless terrorism and roguestates. By «s’auto-immuniser» he means «cette étrange logiqueillogique par laquelle un vivant peut spontanément détruire, de fa-çon autonome, cela même qui, en lui, se destine à le protéger contrel’autre, à l’immuniser contre l’intrusion agressive de l’autre»14. Thisdevolution or dissolution of the autonomy of the self, the ipseity ofa self, is described by Girard as the structural effect of a ubiquitousviolence in which the identity of self and other, of model and imi-tator, disintegrates into an omnivorous violence which for all in-tents and purposes becomes the true subject of human interaction.Individuality and identity are obliterated in the ubiquitous pro-liferation of mimetic doubles, where autos and allos are all caughtup in a mêlée of violent reciprocity. For Girard, the agency of thisauto-immunizing dynamic is Christian revelation, «la victime pa-radoxale du savoir qu’elle apporte»15. It is the only religion whichwill have foreseen its own failure16.In such a world as this, that of irreversible globalization and ofthe commensurate threat of terrorism that goes with it, Derrida ar-gues that we are faced with the end of war as an institution, «unefin de la guerre, la fin du concept même de guerre, du concept eu-ropéen, du concept juridique de guerre»17. This is what is meant bythe ambiguous title of the concluding chapter of his book: «Arriver– aux fins de l’état (et de la guerre et de la guerre mondiale)»: theend of the state is achieved by wars that put an end to states and towar. What he is evoking here is described by Paul Dumouchel as «é-tats de violence» in which the differences between political andcriminal acts have eroded – just about everywhere18. Such anti-ter-rorist innovations as black sites, extraordinary rendition, enhancedinterrogation, special ops, and drone-targeted assassinations, not tomention pre-emptive war, Guantanamo and Abu Graib, are ampleevidence for this, as is the unprecedented latitude granted to theprosecution of «enemy non-combatants». Derrida’s post-structuralintuitions of nearly ten years ago are corroborated by Girard in hisreading of history through the eyes of Clausewitz – and in his re-
13 J. Derrida, Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison, Paris, Gallilée, 2003.14 Ibid., p. 173.15 R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 18.16 Ibid., p. 10.17 J. Derrida, Voyous cit., p. 174.18 Ibid., p. 296.
118 Lebenswelt, 1 (2011)
reading Clausewitz from the retrospective view of the wars (1870,1914-18, 1939-45, 2002-, 2003-) that have succeeded him. War, hesays, has disappeared as an institution19, paradoxically, by virtue ofits ubiquitous spread: «Nous sommes donc plus que jamais en guer-re, à l’heure où la guerre elle-même n’existe plus. Nous avons àcombattre une violence que plus rien ne contraint ni ne maîtrise»20.This is the case because, as Clausewitz intuited from his ex-perience of the Napoleonic wars, which he fought with Prussia andthen with Russia when Prussian sovereignty capitulated in the wa-ke of Jena (1806), the «trend to extremes» («Streben nach dem Äus-sersten»21) in the deployment of violence has become «the uniquelaw of history»22. This is not a law imposed from without, but fromwithin the internecine energies of technological progress andinstitutional devolution that over the past two centuries has en-gaged ever larger alliances and ever more devastating violence. Theeighteenth century saw the last of conventional wars, of war as aninstitution, where the rituals of dueling prevailed among sovereignnation states. With universal conscription and total mobilization in-augurated by Napoleonic wars, which in Spain also first witnessedthe terrorism of partisan and guerrilla warfare, the structure of theduel persists but without its ceremonial constraints, in the sameway that sacrificial, scapegoating violence is on the loose, shorn ofrituals that contained it. Clausewitz exhibits a nostalgia for theetiquette governing the ancien régime’s «guerre en dentelles»,while foreseeing that belligerence had enlarged and accelerated thedevastations of total war. In the twentieth century the existence ofentire populations has been targeted, and with atomic weapons thepopulation of the earth as a whole is at risk. However muchClausewitz recoiled against the implications of his intuitions, hesaw «wars of extermination» («Vernichtungskriege» [1832, 1.11])as an inevitable, logical extension of the violence he witnessed first-hand. Girard pursues the «logique apocalyptique de son esprit»23that in his unfinished treatise he sought at once to elucidate and todeny (very like, I would add, Plato confronted by the evidence ofmimetic doubling that he unveils and expels in the Phaedrus and inthe Republic).
19R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 14.20 Ibid., p. 22.21C. Von Clausewitz, op. cit., passim.22R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 20.23 Ibid., p. 18.
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In his attempt to reduce war once again to issues of strategyand tactics subordinated to political reasoning, we find Clausewitzendeavoring to produce a technical manual of the sort that wouldgratify the interests of rationalist political thinkers such as Ray-mond Aron, who dedicated two volumes to Von Krieg in a failed ef-fort, as Girard sees it24, to align the geopolitical strategies of theCold War with traditional conceptions of aggression and defense.For Girard those conceptions are defunct. What is meant by the title
Achever Clausewitz is the project to fully articulate the implicationsof its author’s fundamental intuition about the «trend to extremes»:auch die gebildetsten Völker konnen gegeneinander leidenschaftlichentbrennen... Wir wiederholen also unseren Satz: der Krieg ist ein Aktder Gewalt, und es gibt in der Anwendung derselben keine Grenzen; sogibt jeder dem anderen das Gesetz, es entsteht eine Wechselwirkung, diedem Begriff nach zum äussersten führen muss. Dies ist die ersteWechselwirkung und das erste Äusserste, worauf wir stossen. (1832,1.3)For Girard, «l’action réciproque» (Wechselwirkung) translates as «leprincipe mimétique»25. What triggers and fairly guarantees thistrend is a mimetically driven escalation of violence, the behavior ofeach belligerent tending to copy that of his rival, but in extrameasure so as to defeat him absolutely, such that the law ofmimetic reciprocity displaces or replaces the agency of an auto-nomous subjects, the presumed and evanescent autos of modernindividualism – and of sovereign nation states. «C’est toujoursl’autre», Girard writes, «qui décide à ma place et m’oblige à lui ré-pondre. Et le groupe décide toujours pour l’individu»26. Self andother are captive of a mimetic dynamic in which the difference be-tween self and other dissolves.Girard describes this anthropological view as a «pensée ducontinu», by contrast with thinking processes which confide in di-screte entities, in conceptual and institutional differences and or-derly hierarchies of class and members, genus and species. «Only areligious interpretation will grasp the essential»27, for he sees Clau-sewitz’s insights as continuous with the sacrificial origins of cul-ture:
24Ibid., p. 13.25 Ibid., p. 146.26 Ibid., p. 60.27 Ibid., p. 15.
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Clausewitz apporte davantage à l’anthropologie qu’à la science politique.C’est pourquoi je trouve chez lui, en puissance, ce qui m’intéresse depuistoujours, en tant qu’anthropologue: une pensée du continu, non du di-scontinu; de l’indifférenciation et non des différences.28The looming apocalypse replicates our violent origins but without ascapegoat mechanism to contain our destructiveness. Girard readsthe early chapters of Vom Kriege as an incipient deconstruction ofthe differences (aggression/defense, armed observation/ exter-mination, partisan/military confrontation, war/peace – which to-day only means preparedness for war, as armed observation), inwhich rationalist political scientists have confided in explaining ourworld. Thereby they miss Clausewitz’s stunning insight into themimetically driven acceleration of violence: every violence genear-tes its double, as «dasselbe tut der Gegner; also neue gegenseitigeSteigerung, die in der blossen Vorstellung wieder das Bestrebenzum Äussersten haben muss» (1.2).With the entire human species at risk by our own hand, tradi-tional academic differentiations are pointless, irrelevant. Clause-witz himself is striving to maintain such differences with his fa-mous definition of «war as an extension of politics by other means»(VIII.6.B). Against the view of war as an instrument of policy («derpolitik»), and subordinate to it, Girard insists here, as he hadalready in La Violence et le sacré29, that those seeking to use vio-lence, to instrumentalize it, are in turn used by it30. The lives it con-sumes only fuels the mimetically triggered appetite for more car-nage. As Benoît Chantre remarks of Clausewitz’s famous axiom,«Quand on creuse un peu cette réalité de la guerre, telle que Clau-sewitz la donne à penser, on découvre que c’est la politique quiappartient à la violence et non la violence à la politique»31. In theclassic conception as defined by Clausewitz, policy presides hierar-chically over the difference between policy or politics and war. Thisamounts to what Jean-Pierre Dupuy has identified as a «tangledhierarchy»32, in which one term names a class of which it is a mem-ber, and it is just this hierarchy that modern violence at once re-
28 Ibid., p. 46.29 R. Girard, La violence et le sacré cit., p. 191.30 Ibid., p. 52.31 Id., Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 19.32 See J.P. Dupuy, Ordres et Désordres. Enquête sur un nouveau paradigme, Paris, Seuil, 1982,ch. VII.
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veals and obliterates. What occurs here is what Derrida has descry-bed as a «décapitation», a «double invagination chiasmatique desbords»33, whereby it is war rather than policy that presides overthe difference between them and ultimately demolishes politicsaltogether. As Derrida observes, we are, with globalized commerceand global terrorism in its wake, «en mal de souveraineté», where«ce qui perd alors sa pertinence, en cette phase de ce qu’on appellesi obscurément la ‘mondialisation’, c’est le concept de guerre, etdonc de guerre mondiale, d’ennemi et même de terrorisme, avecl’opposition entre civil et militaire, comme entre armée, police etmilice»34.What also implodes amidst this pandemic con-fusion, a fusionof contraries, is the difference between the sovereignty claimed bythe modern security state and what we denounce everywhere as«rogue states». Derrida remarks that all our armaments, chemical,biological, nuclear, digital («cyberattaques»), etc., are poised to«déstabiliser ou détruire les plus puissants appareils d’Etat»35. Thevery notion of sovereign states disintegrates amidst the multi-plication and proliferation of armaments: «Tout cela est fini», hestates. The apocalyptic thematics of Girard’s exploration of Clau-sewitz resonate sharply with Derrida’s dire prognostic:Une nouvelle violence se prépare et en vérité se déchaine pourlongtemps, de façon plus visiblement suicidaire ou auto-immunitaire quejamais. Cette violence ne relève plus de la guerre mondiale ni même de laguerre, encore moins de quelque droit de la guerre. Et cela n’a riend’assurant, au contraire. Il ne s’agit pour l’essentiel, ni d’une guerreclassique et internationale déclarée selon le vieux jus europeanus, nid’une guerre civile intra-nationale, ni même de ce que Schimitt appela la«guerre des partisans».36This new violence is not an extension of politics, not a form ofaggression or insurgency undertaken for the sake of the liberationof a people or foundation of a state. Efforts to label our currentsituation with the old vocabulary is put down as rationalization ofthe kind that Girard attributes to Aron’s reading of Clausewitz. «Elleconsiste», writes Derrida,
33J. Derrida, Jacques Derrida par Geoffrey Bennington et Jacques Derrida, Paris, Seuil, 1991, p.73.34 Id., Voyous cit., p. 212.35 Ibid., p. 213.36R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 214.
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à accuser et à partir en campagne contre des Etats dits voyous (rogueStates) et en effet peu soucieux du droit international. Cette ratio-nalisation est manoeuvrée par des Etats hégémoniques, à commencerpar les Etats-Unis, dont on a tôt et bien fait de démontrer […] qu’ils secomportent eux-mêmes depuis longtemps comme des rogue States.37In effect, Derrida is indicting the mimetic behavior of the US in itsresponse to terrorism. A manifestly Girardian crisis of difference isbeing described when Girard concerning «le droit», which trans-lates as Right, as international law, «le droit des gens», states: «Ledroit lui-même est fini, il échoue dans tous les coins; même d’ex-cellents juristes, que je connais bien, n’y croient plus. Ils voient quecela s’effondre, s’effrite. Pascal déjà n’y croyait plus»38.Nor does Derrida, for whom this crisis is endemic to nationalsovereignty. Girard is thinking doubtless of Pascal’s notoriousmeditations – veritable deconstructions – on force and justice, thelatter always losing to force (Pensées 298, 299). For Derrida, thedestiny, the trend, of sovereignty, is not law or right but empire:Dès qu’il y a souveraineté, il y a abus de pouvoir et rogue State. L’abus estla loi de l’usage, telle est la loi même, telle est la «logique» d’une sou-veraineté qui ne peut régner que sans partage. Plus précisément, car ellen’y arrive jamais que de façon critique, précaire, instable, la souveraineténe peut que tendre à l’hégémonie impériale. User de ce temps, c’est déjàabuser... Il n’y a donc que des Etats voyous. En puissance ou en acte.L’Etat est voyou. Il y a toujours plus d’Etats voyous qu’on ne pense.39The key phrase here is «régner sans partage», meaning undivided,uncontested rule, which is only achieved by triumph over rivalcontestants for hegemony; the empire that is sovereignty’s trend toextremes is driven by mimetic conflict. Nothing else can explainDerrida’s (re)definition of sovereignty, nothing else than mimeticrivalry is necessary to explain it. Derrida goes on to observe that ifevery sovereign state is in fact a «voyoucratie», then the unsavorynotion of rogue state loses its savor: «Là où il y a toujours plus devoyous qu’on ne le dit ou le fait accroire, il n’y a plus de voyous»,such that the word loses «le sens et la portée»: the more of themthere are, the fewer of them there are40. A putatively foundationaldistinction of political science dissolves in what Girard identifies as
37 J. Derrida, Voyous cit., pp. 214-215.38 R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 196.39 J. Derrida, Voyous cit., p. 146.40 Ibid., p. 146.
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«la différence oscillante, la perte conflictuelle des différences»41.We need mimetic theory here to supplement or complimentDerrida, to «achever» Derrida, because there is a tendency in hisanalyses, which is endemic to philosophical tradition, to ignore, orat least not to adequately thematize, the role of others, of mimeticrivals in the establishment of institutions as in the institution ofconceptuality. This is, in my view, the tragic flaw or original sin ofphilosophy, in whose analyses the other rarely appears, or onlyappears as a theme (a bloodless «alterity») rather than an (inter)-agent. Absent this interactive dimension, deconstruction deprivesitself of any access to genetic explanations – which it is happy to do,since it is a critique of origins. Derrida, to his credit, retrieves agenetic strain in his account of the violent origins of philosophy, butit is usually absent from his writings. He unveils structural ano-malies, in the strong sense of a-nomos, terrifying to Greek thought;he unveils the auto-immunitary impulses inhabiting institutions:from the relatively harmless discourses of philosophy to the baleful,even horrific, trends inhabiting the modern nation state. Girard’sgenetic hypothesis of violent cultural origins allows us to under-stand why these anomalies have surfaced, providing a narrative arcfor human interaction in which the paradoxes and aporia unco-vered by deconstruction are legibly inscribed in events. Voyous,with its many references to American political discourse in its legi-slative and executive branches, and to «le 11 septembre»42, is firmlyplanted in contemporary history. On this plane, his analysis corre-late more decisively with those of Girard.For Derrida as for much of the democratic left in the US, thepresent embodiment of empire is American global hegemony, com-mercial and military. For Girard as for Derrida, the state is foundedon violence (democracy is always yet to come, «à venir»43), a factwhich in our time has come irrefutably to the forefront as ubi-quitous «voyoucratie». Girard succinctly qualifies the politics andpolicies governing Cold War deterrence, with its cynical trade-off ofproxy wars alternating with threats of «massive retaliation», as ba-rely disguised thuggery on the model of crime syndicate gang wars,«une espèce d’accords entre mafias plutôt qu’au niveau du droit.C’est-à-dire que rien n’a été légalisé, rien n’est passé par les NationsUnies. Pour que la dissuasion fonctionne, il ne fallait pas qu’on s’en
41R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 96.42 J. Derrida, Voyous cit., p. 212.43 Ibid., p. 62.
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mêlât. C’etait donc une sorte de système mafieux»44.No wonder, then, that both authors call for a differentrationality than the one governed by the logical-mathematical cal-culus of differences («la raison calculatrice [la ratio, l’intellect, l’en-tendement]»45) amidst an emergent catastrophe Derrida evoked in2003 and which is even more transparent today, when, as he statedthat «la pensée du monde à venir et d’abord de ladite terre humainetraverse la terreur»46. The collapse of sovereignty opens up onwhat Girard names «une raison apocalyptique», over against a fai-led «rationalité politique, dernière forme des vieux rituels»47: «Lerationalisme […] n’était donc pas une vraie mise à distance [fromreligion], mais une digue dont nous voyons qu’elle est en train decéder. En cela, il aura peut-ête été notre dernière mythologie. On acru à la raison, comme jadis on croyait aux dieux...»48. This other ra-tionality is warranted, authorized, by the hegemony of violence thathe evokes in a neo-Hegelian formulation as «l’adéquation de la gu-erre à son concept, l’unité réalisée entre l’alternance et la réci-procité: une oscillation accéléré des différences, un passage à l’ab-straction, en quelque sorte»49. «Abstraction» because the cherisheddifferences between adversaries are void of any other content thanviolence itself: «Les hommes sont donc toujours à la fois dans l’or-dre et dans le désordre, dans la guerre et dans la paix. On peut doncde moins en moins trancher entre ces deux réalités qui, jusqu’à laRévolution française, étaient codifiées, ritualisées. Il n’y a plus dedifférence aujourd’hui»50. Violence always has a head start («unelongueur d’avance») on our rationalizations, outstripping the usesto which we would subordinate it. Apocalyptic rationality is calledfor by reason of the fact that «Le principe mimétique n’est désor-mais plus caché, mais apparu au grand jour»51; it is revealed, un-veilled, which is the etymon of apo-calyptic.Derrida’s call for a new rationality is phrased as «l’exigence
déconstructrice de la raison. Au nom de la raison». «[D]e» is under-lined by the author to insist on both the objective and subjectivesense of the genitive:
44R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 130.45 J. Derrida, Voyous cit., p. 195.46 R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 196.47 Ibid., p. 132.48 Ibid., p. 214.49 Ibid., p. 47.50 Ibid., p. 54.51 Ibid., p. 47.
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Car la déconstruction, si quelque chose de telle existait, cela resterait àmes yeux, avant tout un rationalisme inconditionnel qui ne renonce ja-mais, précisément au nom des Lumières à venir, dans l’espace à ouvrird’une démocratie à venir, à suspendre de façon argumentée, discutée, ra-tionnelle, toutes les conditions, les hypothèses, les conventions et lesprésuppositions, à critiquer inconditionnellemnt toutes les condition-nalités, y compris celles qui fondent encore l’idée critique, à savoir celledu krinein, de la krisis, de la décision et du jugement binaire ou dialecti-que.52The binary logic presumed to preside over differencesbetween legitimate and rogue states, between war and peace, be-tween us and them, right and right, etc., is suspended because su-spected of a violence it occludes. As Girard states, the old Enlight-enment rationalism remythifies what it pretends to demystify53.Let’s look again at Derrida’s deconstructive solution. Every-thing is suspended, argued, criticized unconditionally; the notion ofcritique, of crisis itself, is in crisis: what he is calling for, à son insu,is undifferentiating oscillation described by Girard. Deconstructionis not a solution to the crisis, but its symptomatology; what it pre-scribes is the very disease it seeks to cure. It only mirrors the crisis,the conceptual and institutional meltdown that it seeks to resolve.In Derridean deconstruction, philosophy immunizes itself from anypractical implications or applications whatsoever.Where Derrida wants to suspend, hold off, defer judgment andchoices, Girard urges a decisive choice between trusting in and re-nouncing violence: «Nous sommes donc à l’heure des choix décisif:il n’y aura bienôt plus aucune institution, plus aucun rite, plus aucu-ne ‘différence’ pour régler nos comportements»54. His sense of ur-gency draws strength from Derridean deconstruction.New violence calls for new rationality, which for Girard isanthropological and Biblical, a call to unconditional love, to «la grâ-ce»55; and for Derrida, it calls for deconstructive reasoning that isunconditionally self-questioning. Derrida is concerned with stru-ctural effects underlying and undermining our institutions in amanner that authorizes, I think, Girard’s appeal to an affective res-ponse to our crisis. Derrida does not get us that far; he is a philoso-pher after all, who limits his inquiry to challenging our ratio-
52 J. Derrida, Voyous cit., pp. 196-197.53R. Girard, Achever Clausewitz cit., p. 104.54 Ibid., p. 102.55 Ibid., ch. VIII.
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nalizations: «il faut, au nom de la raison, se méfier parfois des ratio-nalisations»56. But his independent testimony to the crisis ofdifference that threatens to engulf the world in violence is reason e-nough for adherents of mimetic theory to attend to his writings.And such philosophers as remain among us in what some considerour post-philosophical age need to read Girard to understand moreconcretely the real historical developments, the terrible dynamics,to which deconstruction has timely reference.
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